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the Court of Appeals will review the "harmless constitutional error"
doctrine at the earliest possible opportunity and establish clear and
narrowly drawn guidelines for its use. In the absence of such guidelines, the potential for this doctrine's abuse will remain a serious
threat to the carefully constructed rights of criminal defendants." 7
Gregory Kehoe

ESTATES,

POWERS, AND TRUSTS LAW

EPTL § 5-4.3: Recovery permittedfor loss of consortium in wrongful
death action
Section 5-4.3 of the EPTL8 permits recovery in a wrongful
death action' "for pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's
disregarded if they did not contribute to the defendant's conviction. Thus, in Chapman,the
Supreme Court stated that "some constitutional errors . . . are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless,
not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction." 386 U.S. at 22. Typically, the error
consists of the erroneous admission of physical or testimonial evidence in violation of the
defendant's fourth, sixth, or fourteenth amendment rights. E.g., People v. Smith, 60 App.
Div. 2d 566, 401 N.Y.S.2d 35a (4th Dep't 1978); People v. Trappier, 60 App. Div. 2d 896, 401
N.Y.S.2d 295 (2d Dep't 1978); People v. Cowan, 60 App. Div. 2d 634, 400 N.Y.S.2d 179 (2d
Dep't 1977). In such cases, before the error can be held to have been harmless, the court must
examine the admissible and inadmissible evidence presented by the prosecution and conclude
that the erroneously admitted evidence did not, in any way, contribute to the conviction. See
People v. Jones, 61 App. Div. 2d 264, 402 N.Y.S.2d 28 (2d Dep't 1978). In essence, the
appellate court must decide whether the decision at the trial level would have been the same
had the evidence been excluded from consideration. In a case such as Felder, however, the
question does not call for a weighing of the relative impact of evidence. Rather, in order to
hold the error harmless, the court would have to conclude that representation by the layman
did not contribute to the defendant's conviction. It is submitted that the harmless error test
was not meant to permit the court to make such a subjective determination, nor is it precise
enough to properly evaluate the impact of a sixth amendment violation which is present at
every stage of the trial.
,,See note 146 supra.
"'EPTL § 5-4.3 provides in part:
Amount of recovery.
The damages awarded to the plaintiff may be such sum as the jury or, where
issues of fact are tried without a jury, the court or referee deems to be fair and just
compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's death to the
persons for whose benefit the action is brought.
EPTL § 5-4.3.
"I The cause of action for wrongful death was unknown at common law. Sea-Land Serv.,
Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 579 (1974); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cochran, 277 App. Div.
625, 630, aff'd, 302 N.Y. 545 (1951). Believing there was no valid justification for permitting
recovery for personal injuries in a negligence suit and denying such recovery in the event that
the personal injuries resulted in death, the English Parliament enacted The Fatal Accidents
Act, 1846, St. 8 & 10 Vict., c. 93. In re Meng, 96 Misc. 126, 128, 159 N.Y.S. 535; 537 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. County 1916), aff'd, 188 App. Div. 69, 176 N.Y.S. 290 (1st Dep't 1919), rev'd mem.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:594

death."' 50 In construing this provision, New York courts have generally denied recovery for loss of consortium and society.' 1 Recently,
on other grounds, 227 N.Y. 669, 126 N.E. 914 (1920). That act, more commonly referred to
as "Lord Campbell's Act," provided
that whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect
or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued)
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages ... ,
then and in every such case the person who would have been liable if death had
not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages.
The Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, St. 8 & 10 Vict., c. 93, reprinted in 96 Misc. at 128, 159 N.Y.S.
at 537.
In strikingly similar language, the New York State Legislature adopted a cause of action
for wrongful death in 1847. 96 Misc. at 130, 159 N.Y.S. at 538. Although the amount of
recovery was limited to $5,000 by an 1849 amendment, Ch. 256, [1849] N.Y. Laws 388-89,
this limitation was abolished by article I, section 18, of the New York State Constitution of
1894. This later became article I, section 16, of the New York State Constitution of 1938.
Amerman v. Lizza & Sons, Inc., 45 App. Div. 2d 996, 998, 358 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (2d Dep't
1974). Article I, section 16, of the New York State Constitution of 1938 provides that "[t]he
right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be
abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."
Although the present statute limits recovery to compensation for "pecuniary injuries," it has
been held not to violate the New York Constitution. Amerman v. Lizza & Sons, Inc., 45 App.
Div. 2d 996, 358 N.Y.S.2d 220 (2d Dep't 1974). The Amerman court noted that the purpose
of Article I, section 16, was twofold. The constitutional provision was enacted to guarantee
that the statutorily created wrongful death action would not be unilaterally abolished by the
legislature. 45 App. Div. 2d at 998, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 224. In addition, § 16 was intended to
abolish the $5,000 limitation on pecuniary damages which could be recovered. 45 App. Div.
2d at 998, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
11 EPTL § 5-4.3. The purpose of § 5-4.3 is to compensate surviving relatives for loss of
future benefits which would have been received had the decedent lived. See Loetsch v. New
York City Omnibus Corp., 291 N.Y. 308, 310, 52 N.E.2d 448, 449 (1943). Since the statute
provides for "fair and just compensation," the amount awarded lies in the discretion of the
jury. Oddo v. Paterson Bridge Co., 219 App. Div. 518, 521, 220 N.Y.S. 217, 220 (2d Dep't
1927); Liddie v. State, 190 Misc. 347, 351, 75 N.Y.S.2d 182, 186 (Ct. Cl. 1947). In arriving at
a proper award, the trier of fact may consider such factors as the decedent's age, health, life
expectancy, relationship with the persons seeking recovery, disposition to support such persons, working habits, present position and potential for advancement, and the likelihood of
increased earning capacity. See Kraus v. Ford Motor Co., 55 App. Div. 2d 851, 852, 390
N.Y.S.2d 495, 496 (4th Dep't 1976); Tenczar v. Milligan, 47 App. Div. 2d 773, 775, 365
N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (3d Dep't 1975); Horton v. State, 50 Misc. 2d 1017, 272 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Ct.
Cl. 1966).
"I See Osborn v. Kelly, 61 App. Div. 2d 637, 402 N.Y.S.2d 463 (3d Dep't 1978); Bell v.
Cox, 54 App. Div. 2d 920, 388 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1976); Ventura v. Consolidated Edison,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 1977, at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977). The United States Supreme
Court has noted that "[tihe term 'society' [now] embraces a broad range of mutual benefits
each family member receives from the others' continued existence, including love, affection,
care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection." Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet,
414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974). Consortium is the "[c]onjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and
the right of each other to the company, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every

conjugal relation."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

382 (4th ed. 1968). Although at common law

consortium was essentially synonymous with society and companionship, it has developed
into the more specific and special relationship existing between spouses. See D. DOBBS, LAW
OF REMEDIES § 8.11 (West 1973); Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22
MICH.

L. REv. 1 (1923).
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however, in Lehman v. Columbia PresbyterianMedical Center,'52
the Supreme Court, New York County, held that a spouse may
for loss of consortium
properly recover in a wrongful death action
15 3
death.
mate's
her
of
result
a
as
suffered
The decedent in Lehman died 5 days after open heart surgery.'54
The decedent's wife brought suit alleging that her spouse's death
was caused by the defendant's negligence.'55 After a medical malpractice panel found the defendant liable, the plaintiff moved for
an order permitting amendment of her complaint to include a claim
for loss of consortium.'55 Stating that "simple justice mandates the
ending of our present archaic strictures on recoveries in wrongful
death actions," the supreme court granted the motion.'57
In permitting amendment of the complaint, Justice Nusbaum
noted that the meaning of "pecuniary injuries" under EPTL § 5-4.3
appears unsettled.'" Framing the issue as whether "loss of services
and society" are compensable as pecuniary injuries, 5 ' the court was
influenced by the trend in other jurisdictions to broaden the scope
152
93 Misc. 2d 539, 402 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
' Id. at 544, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
,5 Id. at 540, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
' Id. The decedent underwent open heart surgery at Columbia Presbyterian Medical
Center in December 1972. The plaintiff alleged that following surgery her husband was left
unattended in a private room for approximately 10 hours, causing him fear and apprehension
which affected the functioning of his heart and resulted in his death 5 days later. Id.
I' Id.
" Id. at 543, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 954. The court noted that, although the application to
amend was made more than 3 years after issue was joined, the defendants were not prejudiced
since they had notice of the facts. Id. at 544, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 954. Accordingly, Justice
Nusbaum granted the leave to amend pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) which states:
A party may amend his pleading, or supplement it by setting forth additional
or subsequent transactions or occurrences, at any time by leave of court or by
stipulation of all parties. Leave shall be freely given upon such terms as may be
just including the granting of costs and continuances.
It would appear that the order was consistent with the policy underlying CPLR 3025(b).
Except in the three instances where a party may amend his pleading as of right, see CPLR
3025(a), the power to permit a pleading to be amended rests squarely within the court's
discretion. Harriss v. Tams, 258 N.Y. 229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932). In an attempt to avoid
overemphasis on technical form and to permit all substantive rights of the parties to be
litigated, the courts have been liberal in considering motions to amend. See Bendan Holding
Corp. v. Rodner, 245 App. Div. 723, 280 N.Y.S. 252 (2d Dep't 1935) (per curiam); Weitz v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 21 Misc. 2d 932, 198 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960).
Generally the court will not determine the merits of the proposed amendment unless the lack
of merit or sufficiency is clear. Town Bd. v. National Sur. Corp., 53 Misc. 2d 23, 24, 277
N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1967), aff'd mem., 29 App. Div. 2d 726, 286
N.Y.S.2d 122 (3d Dep't 1968); Brodman v. Merchants Fire Assur. Corp., 217 N.Y.S.2d 794
(1st Dep't 1961) (per curiam).
1" 93 Misc. 2d at 541, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
15 Id.
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of recovery in wrongful death actions. ' In addition, the Lehman
court emphasized that more than a century earlier, in Tilley v.
Hudson River Railroad Co.,'"1 the Court of Appeals rejected a nar"1 Id. at 543, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 954. Justice Nusbaum stated that a majority of the states
have allowed recovery for loss of consortium in wrongful death actions. Id. It is submitted
that this is somewhat misleading. While a national trend has developed recognizing loss of
consortium as a proper element of damages in wrongful death actions, it appears that few
states with statutes compensating only for "pecuniary injury" have followed this movement.
Approximately one-fifth of the states have statutes similar to EPTL § 5-4.3, and these jurisdictions generally do not permit recovery for loss of consortium. See S. SPmSER, RcovRY
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3:49 (2d ed. 1975). Even with such a statutory scheme, however,
Michigan and Minnesota have allowed loss of consortium damages. See Smith v. Detroit, 388
Mich. 637, 202 N.W.2d 300 (1972); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961).
After the Smith decision, the Michigan Legislature amended its statute to expressly allow
such recovery. See MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922 (Callaghan 1962). Moreover, in a few jurisdictions, where statutes have been interpreted as limiting recovery to "pecuniary losses,"
judicial decisions have allowed loss of consortium as a proper element of recovery. See SeaLand Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587 n.21 (1974); SPEISER, supra, § 3:49.
The majority of the remaining jurisdictions have allowed recovery for loss of consortium
in wrongful death actions. See SPEISER, supra, § 3:49. Most of these states, however, have
statutes that either expressly enumerate this loss as a proper element of damage, see SeaLand Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587 n.21 (1974); SPEISER, supra, § 3:49, or are
susceptible to such an interpretation since damages are not expressly limited to pecuniary
injuries. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587 n.21 (1974); SPFSER, supra, §
3:49.
The Lehman court also noted that the United States Supreme Court in Sea-Land Serv.,
Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), recently held loss of consortium properly recoverable by
a spouse under the general maritime law. In Gaudet,the plaintiff's husband sustained serious
injuries while aboard the defendant's ship. In a personal injury action based upon the unseaworthiness of the vessel under federal maritime law, the husband was awarded damages for
loss of earnings, pain and suffering, and medical expenses. Id. at 591. After termination of
the personal injury action, the husband died from his injuries. Id. at 574. The plaintiff
thereupon commenced a wrongful death action for damages representing loss of consortium
and funeral expenses. Id. at 591. The wrongful death action was dismissed by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for failure to state a claim and on the grounds of
res judicata. Id. at 574. The fifth circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiff had an independent cause of action for damages that was not affected by her husband's prior recovery for
his personal injuries. 463 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court affirmed and permitted recovery for loss of society. 414 U.S. at 591. The Court noted, however, that such losses
are distinguishable from the mental anguish or grief that a surviving relative may sustain.
Id. at 585-86 n.17. In determining that the latter would not be recoverable in a wrongful death
action, the Court stated that mental anguish or grief is merely an emotional response, whereas
loss of society is loss of a positive benefit for which compensation should be given. Id.
Although the Lehman court, in citing Gaudet, intimated that the Supreme Court found
loss of consortium properly recoverable under the pecuniary loss standard of the Death on
the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1970), this was not the case. The Court, in fact, was
creating an element of wrongful death damage under the nonstatutory federal maritime law.
Although the court mentioned the Death on the High Seas Act, it avoided any explicit
recognition that such a recovery would be permitted under the statute. As one commentator
has noted, the Gaudet decision is especially valuable where the state statute is termed in
equivocal language, rather than where an express limitation of pecuniary losses exists. See
SPEISER, supra, § 3:49 n.5.
18124 N.Y. 471 (1862).
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row interpretation of pecuniary injuries by allowing children to recover for loss of parental services, including parental training and
guidance in a wrongful death action. 62 Interpreting this decision to
permit recovery by children for the loss of society of their parents,
the court concluded that to allow recovery by a spouse for loss of
3
consortium was merely the logical development of the law.
It is submitted that the Lehman court has erred in its interpretation of EPTL § 5-4.3 and has reached a result contrary to prevailing New York law. New York courts have generally distinguished
between loss of services and loss of society or consortium when interpreting EPTL § 5-4.3.64 Since the Lehman court incorrectly equated
"12
93 Misc. 2d at 541, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 953. In Tilley, the plaintiff commenced an action
against the defendant to recover damages for his wife's death which resulted from a train
collision. 24 N.Y. at 471. The Court of Appeals set aside an award of damages on the ground
that the lower court incorrectly charged that the jury could consider the children's interest
in the earnings from the decedent's business. Id. at 473. The Court stated that such earnings
would become the property of the plaintiff upon the decedent's death and that the children's
interest would remain only in respect to any expected inheritance from their father. Id. This
interest the Court found too remote to be within the meaning of the statute. Id. It was noted,
however, that the allowance for loss of parental guidance was proper. Id. at 476. On appeal
following retrial, the Court held that the jury could properly consider the loss of the children
of the decedent's nurture and moral and physical training in estimating pecuniary damages.
Tilley v. Hudson River R.R., 29 N.Y. 252, 287 (1864). Noting that parental guidance may
"improve and perfect the man . . . for worldly success as well as social consideration," the
Court stated that the loss of this possible pecuniary advantage should be compensable. Id.
In so interpreting pecuniary injuries, the Court concluded:
A liberal scope was designedly left for the action of the jury. . . . They are not tied
down to any precise rule; within the limit of the statute, as to amount, and the
species of injuries sustained, the matter is to be submitted to their sound judgment
and sense of justice.
Id. at 286.
rn 93 Misc. 2d at 542, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 953. To support his decision Justice Nusbaum
pointed to the recognition by the Court of Appeals in Millington v. Southeastern Elevator
Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968), that a marital relationship may
be seriously impaired as a result of an injured spouse. Thus, Justice Nusbaum reasoned it is
illogical to allow recovery for impediment to the marital relationship in a negligence suit, and
deny the same recovery if the defendant's act results in death. Accordingly, the Lehman court
stated that recovery for loss of consortium in wrongful death is merely the "natural progression" from Tilley to Millington. 93 Misc. 2d at 543, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 954. Justice Nusbaum
then concluded that the permanent deprivation of a spouse's consortium and society should
be compensated. Id. It is submitted, however, that neither Millington nor Tilley encourage,
as the court intimates, a departure from the traditional rule. Millington was a negligence
action wherein the Court for the first time allowed a wife to recover for loss of consortium.
Indeed, although the Millington Court found damage to the wife, it cannot be argued that
this authorizes a similar recovery in a wrongful death suit brought under a statute which
limits recovery to "pecuniary injuries." Similarly, Tilley allowed recovery for loss of parental
guidance and training while specifically reaffirming the principle that damages must be
limited to pecuniary injury under the statute.
'" Compare Bell v. Cox, 54 App. Div. 2d 920, 388 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1976), Amerman v. Lizza & Sons, Inc., 45 App. Div. 2d 996,358 N.Y.S.2d 220 (2d Dep't 1974), and Horton
v. State, 50 Misc. 2d 1017, 272 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Ct. Cl. 1966), with Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery,
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loss of society with loss of services, 5 it assumed that under Tilley
children can recover for loss of society and therefore could find no
sound reason for denying recovery to married persons for loss of
consortium.' 6 In Tilley, however, although the Court of Appeals
sanctioned damage awards for loss of parental training and guidance in wrongful death actions, it expressly stated that loss of society and companionship would not be compensable.'6 7 Thus, Tilley
provides no support for the position that the Court of Appeals would
sanction an award of damages for loss of consortium in a wrongful
death action.
Although one second department panel has held that a claim
for loss of consortium may be asserted in a wrongful death action,'68
the sounder rule would appear to be the one taken by the majority
of New York courts in denying recovery.' This result appears to be
Inc., 295 N.Y. 270, 67 N.E.2d 155 (1946), and O'Neil v. State, 66 Misc. 2d 936, 323 N.Y.S.2d
56 (Ct. Cl. 1971). But see Martins v. Ford, 53 App. Div. 2d 887, 385 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dep't
1976); Leavy v. Yates, 142 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955).
'' 93 Misc. 2d at 540, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
,6'
Id. at 542, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 953. The Lehman court reasoned that "[t]o recognize that
children suffer from the loss of society of their parents and allow recovery to them in wrongful
death actions, but to reject this concept as between married persons draws a distinction
without a difference." Id., 402 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
'- 24 N.Y. 471, 476 (1862). The Tilley Court analogized the parental training lost by the
children to the benefit a student would lose upon the violation of a teacher's duty and thus
found such a loss to be pecuniary in nature. Id.
lu Martins v. Ford, 53 App. Div. 2d 887, 385 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dep't 1976). In Martins,
the plaintiff-widow, suing individually and in her capacity as administratrix of her husband's
estate, commenced a negligence action seeking to recover damages for loss of consortium. The
court, relying on Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897,
293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968), held that the plaintiff had a valid claim for loss of consortium. 53
App. Div. 2d at 887, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 621. Justice Cohalan, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, contended that Millington was no precedent in a wrongful death action. Id. at 888,
358 N.Y.S.2d at 621. He noted that "despite the lapse of five years from the time of the
Millington decision in 1968 to the instant tragedy in 1972, our State Legislature has taken
no steps to include the Millington rationale in the wrongful death statutes; nor is there any
present indication that it is considering such a step." Id. (Cohalan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
16 In Osborn v. Kelly, 61 App. Div. 2d 367, 402 N.Y.S.2d 463 (3d Dep't 1978), the
plaintiff-executrix sought to recover for loss of consortium in a wrongful death action. The
court, finding recovery for loss of consortium proper only from the date of decedent's injury
to date of death, implicitly rejected loss of consortium as an element of recovery under the
"pecuniary injury" standard of EPTL § 5-4.3. Id. at 370, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 464. Similarly, the
traditional rule denying loss of consortium was retained in Ventura v. Consolidated Edison,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 1977, at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), wherein the court stated that
"[Martins] is not controlling in this department and the court is not presuaded to adopt its
rationale." Id. at col. 4. Ironically, after the decision in Martins, see note 168 supra, a different
second department panel denied recovery for loss of society in a wrongful death action. Bell
v. Cox, 54 App. Div. 2d 920, 388 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1978). In Bell, the court, without
referring to Martins, concluded: "If the law in this regard is to be changed it must be by an
amendment of the statute, or by its reinterpretation by the Court of Appeals." Id., 388
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in accord with the intended reading of EPTL § 5-4.3. When the
legislature first enacted the wrongful death statute ' it was free to
place restrictions on the right to recover.17 ' Moreover, judicial interpretation of "pecuniary injuries" to exclude loss of society and consortium has not prompted legislative response, suggesting a reluctance to broaden the elements of recovery in wrongful death actions.
It is submitted that if change in the traditional New York rule is to
occur, it should come from the legislature.
Elaine Robinson McHale

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

N. Y. U.C. C. § 3-206,-405: Drawer has cause of action against
depositary bank for failure to act in accordance with a restrictive
indorsement
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) contains various provisions which seek both to foster the negotiability of commercial
paper'7 2 and to place the risk of loss of the party who should most
appropriately bear it .' 3 Thus, under the "imposter rule" of section
N.Y.S.2d at 119. Another second department panel has extensively reviewed the history of
the wrongful death action in New York and has noted that the constitutional provision that
protects the statutorily created wrongful death action, see note 149 supra, "left undisturbed
the other then existing limitation in the statute allowing recovery only of pecuniary damages
which the courts of this State had interpreted as barring damages for grief, loss of society
and suffering of survivors." Amerman v. Lizza & Sons, Inc., 45 App. Div. 2d 996, 998, 358
N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (2d Dep't 1974).
170The constitutional limitations on the legislature's right to limit recoverable damages
under the wrongful death statute were not adopted until 1894. See note 149 supra.
M7Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 579 (1974); 2 F. HIAPER & F. JAMEs,
LAW OF TORTS § 24.1, at 1285 (1956).
M Section 3-104(1) lists the prerequisites of negotiability. The instrument must be
signed by the maker or drawer, promise unconditionally the payment in money of a sum
certain on demand or at a definite time, and be payable to order or to bearer. These prerequisites are discussed in detail elsewhere in the Code. See N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 3-105 to -107, -109, 112 to -114 (McKinney 1964).
'71 Section 3-406, for example, provides that the party whose negligence "substantially"
contributes to the alteration of an instrument or to the unauthorized affixing of a signature
thereon shall, if the drawee pays in good faith, bear the burden of the resulting loss. Section
3-418 codifies the rule of Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762), which held that money paid
out by an innocent drawee on an instrument bearing a forged signature may not be recovered
from a holder in due course or an innocent purchaser who is able to show detrimental reliance.
Section 3-419 delineates the circumstances whereby an instrument is deemed converted and
allocates liability therefor. Subsection 3 limits the conversion liability of depositary and other
collecting banks to the infrequent instances when the bank holds the proceeds of an instrument, fails to act in good faith or in accordance with reasonable commercial standards, or

